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Research Article
Becoming an Adult in Europe:
A Macro(/Micro)-Demographic Perspective
Francesco C. Billari 
1
Abstract
Extreme cases in demography are important challenges for researchers, and the still
important heterogeneity of European societies is a blessing for scholars interested in
studying the importance of cultural and institutional factors. In the transition to
adulthood the “latest-late” pattern of Southern Europe cohabits with its opposite
“earliest-early” pattern of the Nordic countries. In this paper, I discuss multifaceted
approaches to the explanation of why becoming an “adult” in Europe appears so
diverse. I use secondary data analyses and present cross-country correlations: welfare
state and institutional arrangements, historical and deeply rooted cultural differences, as
well as economic and policy factors, and ideational change. Moreover, micro-level
determinants play different roles in different societies. Future research on the transition
to adulthood in Europe needs to be multilevel, comparative and interdisciplinary, and to
consider the potential implication of persistent differences in patterns.
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1. The importance of (micro- and) macro-level extremes: oldest-old
and lowest-low. What about latest-late?
Demographic research has always been profoundly influenced by population trends.
These trends have affected both the object of the discipline (“What do demographers
study?”) and the methods and techniques used (“How do demographers study the issues
they are interested in?”). Let us for instance look at recent decades. Research on
longevity has been substantially influenced by the emergence of the oldest-olds. More
recently, research on fertility has been influenced by the fact that some countries have
reached what have been defined as lowest-low fertility levels. Changes in fertility and
survival have been important seeds in the development of research directions at the new
Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research (Wachter, 2003). Some researchers
have even pointed out that the emergence of long lives, low fertility, and high
immigration has contributed to the creation of a “new demography” (Vaupel, 2000; see
also Kohler, 2000).
The extreme cases of demography are sometimes located at the macro, societal
level (nations, regions), and sometimes at the individual or household level. Let us
think, for instance, about oldest-old longevity (with extreme cases at the individual,
micro-level, i.e. centenarians and super-centenarians), and lowest-low fertility (with
extreme cases at the societal, macro-level, i.e. Italy, Spain and Central and Eastern
European countries). Our main argument will be that attention on extreme cases can be
rewardingly broadened to point at another type of macro-level: latest-late transition to
adulthood and to contrast it with the opposite situation. “Latest-late” has been used by
Billari et al. (2002) to describe the peculiar pattern of late home-leaving, union
formation, and transition to parenthood of Italy and Spain. This pattern can only be
partially compared with the general postponement in the transition to parenthood,
typical of the “Second Demographic Transition” accompanying Western Europe over
the last decades of the Twentieth century, as illustrated by Lesthaeghe and van de Kaa
(Lesthaeghe and van de Kaa, 1986; van de Kaa, 1987). The postponement of first births
has indeed taken place in all Western European countries and in most Central and
Eastern European countries, although at different paces (Lesthaeghe, 2001). This
general trend has also led to the idea that a distinct “postponement transition” is guiding
recent transitions to parenthood (Kohler et al., 2002). However, the trend in
postponement is not necessarily similar for all countries and for all events shaping the
transition to adulthood, i.e. leaving home and union formation (Billari, 2004).
We can foresee that the “new demography” of Europe and of developed countries
will take advantage of research carried out on oldest-old longevity, lowest-low fertility,
and latest-late transition to adulthood. Extreme cases will thus shape the content of
demographic research, by providing puzzles, in addition to the new developments inDemographic Research – Special Collection 3: Article 2
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methodology. In this paper, we shall focus - adopting a demographic point of view - on
household and family events taking place during what have been defined as the young
adult years (i.e. more or less from age 18 to 34), years that are “demographically dense”
(Rindfuss, 1991). This stage of the life course has been an important challenge for
demographers in previous years, and has occupied an increasingly wide space in the
agenda of scholars (Liefbroer, 1999). Our title “Becoming an Adult in Europe” is
inspired by a similar title (and paper) by Hobcraft and Kiernan (1995), who discuss the
standard “endpoint” of the transition to adulthood: “Becoming a Parent in Europe”. We
have also borrowed the idea from Hobcraft and Kiernan to base the general reflection
on life-course transitions on empirical trends and innovative works from the literature
pointing to multifaceted explanations, and the focus on Europe. As a matter of fact,
Europe provides an extremely interesting setting to study the transition to adulthood.
Cultural and institutional heterogeneity, economic differences and the interaction
between them, have shaped an incredibly diverse way of “becoming an adult” in a
demographic sense. Contemporary diversity in pathways to adulthood has become
evident when the data from Fertility and Family Surveys have become available for a
large set of European countries (Corijn and Klijzing, 2001). This diversity appears to be
challenging also to scholars who have extensive experience in studying the transition to
adulthood, and who realize that Europe provides an excellent field for investigation
(Goldscheider, 2000). Fernandez Cordón (1997) has argued that in a time of overall
social and economic convergence in European countries, it is hard to find social
indicators with such striking differences among EU countries as those related to the
transition to adulthood. The differences between societies are striking, but intra-society
heterogeneity is massive as well. In fact, one can predict that individualization and path
dependence may also produce a macro-level convergence to micro-level diversity
(Billari and Wilson, 2001). Here, reporting analyses that are themselves heterogeneous,
we shall reflect upon the heterogeneity at the macro-level by looking at the main
explanatory ideas for societal differences in the transition to adulthood, and upon the
micro-macro link (how some micro-level factors do interact with macro-level
circumstances to shape the transition to adulthood) (Note 1).
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, after a short recall of the situation,
we review the explanatory directions for diversity in European transitions to adulthood.
We focus on macro-level differentials and on the interaction between such differential
and micro-level determinants of life-course transitions. Pure macro relationships, with
some speculations on the existence of two stable patterns, are illustrated and discussed
in Section 3. The final section contains some ideas on future directions in research.Demographic Research – Special Collection 3: Article 2
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2. European diversity in the transition to adulthood: explanatory
directions and their interactions
European diversity, both in states and trajectories of patterns in transition to adulthood,
is a clear challenge for researchers interested in the topic, as it has been since early
pioneering studies (Kiernan, 1986). It is also a challenge for those who want to
investigate whether a modernization process is guiding demographic behavior in
Europe, and whether there will be a convergence in demographic behavior
(Goldscheider, 2000; Coleman, 2002). This appears clearly from data from the Fertility
and Family Surveys held (mostly) during the 1990s. We chose a simple indicator: the
share of individuals having left home, formed a union, and having become parents by
age 25 (for women, see Table 1). Similar results are obtained by looking at different
indicators. In the literature we can also find analyses of the sequencing of events using
FFS data, showing similar degrees of heterogeneity between nations (Billari et al.,
2001; Corijn and Klijzing, 2001; Billari and Wilson, 2001).
To start our discussion on explanatory directions, we can allude to two opposite
patterns in age at home-leaving: 1) the “latest-late” pattern in Southern Europe, with
late transitions that are highly de-standardized by age, but very standardized vis-à-vis
the relationship to union formation; 2) the “earliest-early” pattern of transition of
Nordic countries (the term is willingly exaggerated) where the detachment from
parental home takes place around age 19/20, with a high age standardization and a more
diverse connection with union formation. Other European societies may be considered
to be in between such extreme cases. Why is there such diversity? And why is such
diversity narrowing, showing convergence for some behavior, while it is even
increasing, with signs of divergence, for other types of behavior? An answer to such
questions is more the task of an entire research program than the capacity of a paper.
Here we shall sketch some of the explanatory directions that have been taken,
distinguishing macro-level factors and trends, and the interaction between macro- and
micro-level factors. We shall put a particular emphasis on the latter point and in
particular on 1) how micro-level determinants can have different weight in different
macro-level situations and 2) how social interactions may shape the transition to
adulthood (especially in terms of postponement of events).Demographic Research – Special Collection 3: Article 2
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Table 1: Women having experienced demographic events by the 25
th birthday, two
cohorts at 10-year distance: estimates from the Fertility and Family
Surveys.
Cohort 1 Cohort 2
Country Cohorts Have left the
parental
home
Have entered a
co-resident
union
Have
become
mothers
Have left the
parental
home
Have entered a
co-resident
union
Have
become
mothers
Austria (1) 1956-61
(2) 1966-71
86.1 74.8 52.5 83.0 70.2 43.4
Belgium (Flemish
speaking)
(1) 1951-56
(2) 1961-66
89.3 86.1 47.1 82.3 75.7 26.3
Bulgaria (1) 1958-62
(2) 1968-72
n.a. 75.6 69.6 n.a. 71.9 69.4
Czech Republic (1) 1958-62
(2) 1968-72
84.2 68.8 76.6 86.9 78.0 72.4
Estonia (native born) (1) 1954-58
(2) 1964-68
79.1 73.2 68.2 76.0 79.0 69.1
Finland (1) 1950-54
(2) 1960-64
90.2 75.7 49.1 91.0 77.8 36.1
France (1) 1954-58
(2) 1964-68
88.8 81.7 57.5 86.6 76.1 36.4
Greece (1) 1960-64
(2) 1970-74
83.3 75.5 54.5 72.8 54.9 34.8
Hungary (1) 1953-57
(2) 1963-67
80.4 85.9 71.8 80.6 83.8 66.0
Italy (1) 1956-60
(2) 1966-70
67.7 61.2 44.3 64.7 40.7 23.5
Latvia (1) 1955-60
(2) 1965-70
71.3 81.4 70.6 58.8 80.8 68.6
Lithuania (1) 1955-60
(2) 1965-70
74.4 77.5 62.4 63.7 76.9 70.4
Netherlands (1) 1953-58
(2) 1963-68
92.6 81.1 32.3 88.9 71.3 19.8
Norway (1) 1950
(2) 1960
88.7 78.0 58.1 90.7 78.5 44.2
Poland (1) 1952-56
(2) 1962-66
66.8 73.0 64.2 62.3 74.0 65.4
Portugal (1) 1957-62
(2) 1967-72
72.1 70.6 61.8 60.7 58.5 43.5
Slovenia (1) 1956-60
(2) 1966-70
82.0 84.9 80.5 77.4 83.8 69.7
Spain (1) 1955-60
(2) 1966-70
73.3 71.2 50.0 56.6 53.3 33.2
Sweden (1) 1954
(2) 1964
95.0 82.2 47.6 96.7 79.8 36.9
Switzerland (1) 1950-54
(2) 1960-64
95.0 68.1 34.7 93.9 66.2 27.1
Source: UN/ECE FFS Standard Country Tables: http://www.unece.org/ead/pau/ffs/ffs_standtabframe.htm.Demographic Research – Special Collection 3: Article 2
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2.1 Macro-level explanations of international differences: institutional and
conjunctural factors, long-term cultural differences and ideational change
Macro-level factors affecting the transition to adulthood can be, in a simplified view,
categorized on a 2 x 2 table. On one dimension of the table we can put the traditional
“culture vs. economy” dichotomy. In this paper we take a broad view of economy as
“political economy” or “political economics” (Persson and Tabellini, 2000): our notion
of economy includes economic trends, institutional settings and the welfare state (i.e.
the broad interactions between the economic and political setting). On the other
dimension of the table, we can put the historical stability of macro-level factors (slowly
changing  vs. quickly changing). The transition to adulthood in European nations is
shaped, on the one hand, by slowly changing institutional factors (i.e. the welfare state),
as well as by specific socio-economic policies (i.e. labor market or housing policies,
that is, factors that change more quickly than institutions) (Note 2). In fact, seminal
papers have indicated the transition to adulthood as an illustrative case of a set of
problems concerning the way institutional constraints affect the construction of the life
course (Modell et al., 1976). On the other hand, the way one becomes an adult in a
demographic sense is shaped by long-term cultural differences that have deep historical
roots (i.e. normative expectations and ideals on intergenerational relationships and
family ties), as well as by ideational factors whose dynamics is faster than long-term
cultural differences (i.e. value orientations). All such factors are important in shaping
actual differences between countries, although each of the four types of explanatory
factors actually refers to a different scholar tradition.
As far as institutional factors are concerned, they are of primary interest to
scholars interested in studying the welfare state, and they are connected to long-term
differences between countries in the transition to adulthood that are resisting forces
driving convergence. In particular, the idea that different welfare regimes exist, each
with specific life course consequences, is at the heart of the work of Esping-Andersen
(1999) and Mayer (2001). The main issue in the literature concerns the number of
welfare regimes we should use to describe current institutional settings in Europe. So
far, a principal focus has been on Western Europe. A three-world categorization was
first proposed by Esping-Andersen, who also leaves the door open for a four-world
categorization (Note 3) – including 1) Social democratic (Nordic) welfare regimes
oriented to individuals; 2) Liberal market welfare regimes (again oriented to
individuals); 3) Conservative continental welfare regimes oriented to the family, and 4)
Southern European or Familistic (Note 4) welfare regimes (Note 5). Each of the
regimes shapes, in a completely different way, the whole “package” of behaviors in the
transition to adulthood (as an example we report the predictions of Mayer in Table 2).
In fact, the emergence of modern welfare states is one of the main factors that haveDemographic Research – Special Collection 3: Article 2
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contributed to the “institutionalization” of the life course, and such institutionalization
has been mostly concerned with the transition to adulthood (Mayer and Müller, 1986).
This influence is also going to continue: Blossfeld (2000), for instance, has argued that
country-specific institutions will channel the way through which the globalization of
economic life will affect life courses of individuals in developed countries, thus
preventing life courses from becoming more similar.
As a caveat, and to get back to the economy (or institution) vs. culture debate,
prominent scholars in the literature on welfare regimes note that such regimes cannot be
taken as purely exogenous in the long-run perspective (Mayer, 2001). For instance,
whether a society encourages young adults to attend higher education at universities
with on-campus accommodation, as opposed to having local universities where young
adults and their parents can co-reside for a longer period, depends on the prevailing
views of inter-generational relationships. The causal link would then be from the
cultural framework to the making of institutional settings, which would mean that in a
longer causation chain, long-term cultural differences explain a substantial part of the
differences in family (Pfau-Effinger, 1999) and social policies.
Table 2: Prediction of life course outcomes in four types of political economies
according to Mayer.
Liberal Conservative Social Democratic Familistic
Age at leaving home Early, high variance Medium, high variance Early, low variance Late, high variance
Age at leaving
school/training
Medium homogeneous High stratified Medium Low stratified
Labor market entry Early, stop-gap, low skill Late, integrated, high skill Early, integrated Late, marginal
Source: adapted from Mayer (2001).
Social and economic policies that are in place during a specific time period also
significantly shape the transition to adulthood. We refer, for instance, to specific
policies (i.e. fiscal policies, family policies, housing policies, labor-market policies) that
may change faster than the institutional setting. This is also true of specific economic
trends that are not explicitly under the control of national policy-makers (see i.e.
Andersson, 2000; Hoem, 2000 on the transition to parenthood and fertility). Economic
trends and socio-economic policies are so clearly interrelated that it is often not possible
to identify their separate effects on demographic behavior (see i.e. Hoem and Hoem,
1997). The adoption of new policies, i.e. on housing subsidies or on limits to down-
payment in mortgages, are clearly important determinants of how young adults shapeDemographic Research – Special Collection 3: Article 2
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their pathways to adulthood, and the same is true for family policies, such as maternity
policies, parental-leave policies, childcare services, and child benefits (Neyer, 2003). It
is difficult to disentangle whether such policies belong to the welfare state per se (and
thus are stable in a mid-term historical perspective), or whether they belong to political
choices that are continuously subject to revision. In any case, changes in such policies
modify the opportunities that young adults face during their early adult years, and they
can be read in the classic demographic terms of “period effects”. The spread of
uncertainty in young adulthood, as in the case of increasingly difficult access to the
labor market, as well as other factors, for instance increases in the return to education,
may also explain period trends and differences (Bernardi, 2000). In fact, the latter type
of factors has been used by Kohler et al. (2002) to argue that postponement of the
transition to parenthood (but similarly, of other demographic events during early
adulthood) may arise as a rational response to socio-economic incentives. Socio-
economic conjunctural factors may explain sudden changes in patterns in a country, and
they may constitute macro-events that trigger changes having long-term consequences.
Such conjunctural factors are, however, unlikely to explain long-term stable differences
between societies. But we shall return to the issue in Section 2.2.
Concerning  long-term cultural differences that form the basis of present
differences in behavior, we may distinguish the literature along east-west and north-
south divides. Of course, these divisions are necessarily simplistic (similar to divisions
according to welfare regimes). Hajnal (1965) (Note 6) traces an east-west divide in
historical family systems in Europe: the Hajnal line runs along an imaginary line
connecting Trieste and St. Petersburg. To the west of the line the family formation
pattern leans towards a neo-local nuclear family, with relatively late marriage and a
significant proportion of people who never married. Of those not marrying, most of the
people leave the parental home anyway. To the east of the line, marriage is supposed to
be early and universal, and the family is often extended. However, this last feature has
an ambivalent impact. Early and generalized leaving home occurs for those who marry
early without staying with their parents. Those who marry and stay with their parents
may continue living with their parents for a long time, and in some cases they may also
opt for co-residence with their parents as a permanent solution. A great heterogeneity
has been shown by studies focusing to the west of the Trieste-St. Petersburg line. Pre-
industrial patterns within the West show that early home leaving prior to marriage was
common in many areas (Laslett, 1983; Wall, 1989; Mitterauer, 1992). In the central and
north-western parts of the continent, a significant percentage of young people spent a
more or less prolonged period of time outside their parents' household, normally
involved as rural servants or as urban workers. As a consequence, young people often
left the parental household long before marriage. The same was not true in other areas
of South-western Europe, where time spent as servants was normally short-lived, andDemographic Research – Special Collection 3: Article 2
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only involved a small percentage of the population. Nevertheless, the existing picture of
historical co-residential patterns is far from complete, and it shows considerable
geographical and historical variance. Specific demographic, economic, and cultural
factors determined family and household systems (just as they do today), including
considerable regional variations on attributes such as the welfare capability of the
family, the functioning of the household as a working unit, the role and status of
women, marriage patterns, and co-residence of kin, among others (Wall, 1995). The
presence of long-term cultural continuities, in particular concerning the strength of
inter-generational ties between societies, has been emphasized by scholars looking at
differences between North-western and South-western Europe (Reher, 1998; Micheli,
2000; Dalla Zuanna, 2001). Reher (1998), for instance, systematically and
comprehensively compares historical and current family patterns in Europe, west of the
Trieste-St. Petersburg line. He emphasizes the Southern European pattern of household
formation, relating a cleavage between two patterns to the times of the late Roman
Empire and the early Middle Ages. According to Reher, in Southern Europe, the
influence of Muslims raised the importance of kinship and vertical relationships
between generations, so that the prolonged stay of children in their parents’ home and
the caring work of children towards their parents are two faces of the same coin, a
“strong” family. Some authors emphasize historical continuity up to the extreme,
substantially denying that there is anything new in the transition to adulthood of
Italians, and that “latest-late” transition have traditionally been there (Barbagli et al.,
2003). In the North, Germanic tradition and the Reformation contributed to the
development of a “weak” family. Such differences have contributed to shape
institutional settings at the societal level, with, for instance, welfare states implicitly or
explicitly favoring various types of living arrangements (Holdsworth, 2000). Besides
differences in the actual timing of life course transitions, it is interesting to notice that
the share of young adults who declare to be dependent on parents and/or family
members for their income (now the majority in the EU 15) is by far larger in “strong
ties” and familistic societies with respect to “weak ties” social-democratic societies
(Table 3). This dependence also translates in larger inter vivos transfers from children to
parents during key events in the transition to adulthood, and with a larger geographical
proximity after residential independence (Glaser and Tomassini, 2000; Tomassini et al.,
2003).Demographic Research – Special Collection 3: Article 2
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Table 3: Share of young adults (age 15-24) who declare to be dependent on their
parents or family members. European Union (15 states).
% dependent on parents/family
1997 2001
Austria 41 43
Belgium 48 58
Denmark 19 19
Finland 41 40
France 48 61
Germany 38 46
Germany (East) 35 46
Germany (West) 38 46
Greece 51 71
Ireland 38 32
Italy 68 74
Luxembourg 58 66
Netherlands 33 43
Portugal 51 54
Spain 62 67
Sweden 34 39
United Kingdom 17 21
EU 15 45 54
Coefficient of variation between
countries
3.24 3.22
Source: Eurobarometer (INRA, 2001). The coefficient of variation is computed using the data for Germany only (not distinguishing
East and West Germany).
Interpretations based on ideational change, clearly connected to modernization
theories, have almost become a paradigm for the interpretation of demographic change
in Western societies, with the key idea of a Second Demographic Transition starting in
the 1960s (Lesthaeghe and van de Kaa, 1986; van de Kaa, 1987). The main factors
advocated by the proponents of ideational change as the main motor are the
accentuation of individual autonomy, the rejection of institutional control and
autonomy, and the rise of values associated to “higher order needs” (see i.e. Surkyn and
Lesthaeghe, 2004). The emergence of “new” behaviors (like unmarried cohabitation
and single living) during early adult years, has been taken as one of the signs of the
process of individualization of life courses which is used to depict the evolution ofDemographic Research – Special Collection 3: Article 2
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Western European and North American societies towards a “new modernity”
(Buchmann, 1989; Beck, 1992; Giddens, 1990). Individualization implies that the
normative regulation of life courses becomes more lenient than in the past (somehow
differently from the idea that life courses are institutionalized by the welfare state)
(Note 7). We can locate the ideational change point of view within a “developmental”
idea of societies that is common among demographers analyzing long-term trends:
societies are assumed to develop through stages over a sequence leading to a certain
direction. This idea, intertwined with the notion of “transition”, has had an impressive
impact on demographic research (Thornton, 2001). Of course, cross-country analyses in
a specific period do not necessarily provide perfect tests for the transition to new
situations, because if transitions follow specific sequences, different societies can be
found in different stages of such a sequence (van de Kaa, 1997) (Note 8). During a
transition, there may also be rise in the difference between societies. A simple instance
of continuity and change in ideas is reported in Table 4, where we can see data from the
Eurobarometer on young people aged 15-24 from the EU 15 in 1997 and 2001. Taking
indicators of secularization and tolerance, for instance those related to the rights of
homosexuals to get married and/or to adopt children, we can see that young Europeans
are still fairly heterogeneous, and that the heterogeneity between countries has even
risen when looking at a simple indicator such as the coefficient of variation between
countries.
To sum up, no single approach is in principle satisfactory per se in explaining
differences in the transition to adulthood in Europe, let alone extreme cases such as the
“latest-late” pattern of Southern Europeans. It is plausible to think that all factors play a
role and intersect in creating an extreme situation. The Southern European familistic
welfare regime, as predicted for instance by Mayer, pushes the postponement of young
adult transition further to later ages. The lack of social policies (i.e. unemployment
protection) and the weakness of family policies constitute a further element, together
with rising uncertainty in a two-tier labor market. In addition, strong links between
parents and children and long co-residence are not at all new under the Southern sun, as
researchers who are scrutinizing history emphasize. Furthermore, ideational changes
that have taken place in most other parts of Europe will still take some time to evolve in
the Southern region. The challenge for research, and for policymakers interested in
helping young people make their choices, is to evaluate the relative weight of the
different factors in shaping the extreme case. Needless to say, different combinations of
the factors may explain the other side of the extreme (i.e. the Nordic pattern of
transition to adulthood). We shall go back to this idea in Section 3. Prior to that, we
shall discuss how the impact of micro-level factors is channeled through the macro-
level contextual determinants that we have discussed so far.Demographic Research – Special Collection 3: Article 2
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Table 4: Share of young adults (age 15-24) in favor of the rights of homosexuals
1) to get married; 2) to adopt children: 1997 and 2001. European Union
(15 states).
Get married Adopt children
1997 2001 1997 2001
A u s t r i a 4 16 63 34 8
B e l g i u m 4 96 33 04 0
D e n m a r k 7 18 23 85 4
Finland 59 65 24 30
F r a n c e 5 66 64 34 3
Germany 43 57 35 46
Germany (East) 36 53 34 47
Germany (West) 45 59 36 45
G r e e c e 4 73 82 92 4
Ireland 36 44 27 27
I t a l y 4 03 92 12 0
Luxembourg 59 59 38 45
Netherlands 80 85 64 62
Portugal 50 62 32 29
S p a i n 7 67 45 35 4
Sweden 60 76 20 41
United Kingdom 43 50 30 43
EU 15 52 59 36 41
Coefficient of variation between
countries
3.98 4.23 3.16 3.50
Source: Eurobarometer (INRA, 2001). The coefficient of variation is computed using the data for Germany only (not distinguishing
East and West Germany).
2.2 Micro-macro interactions: from small at micro to large at macro?
Differences among countries in behavior can also be due to differences in the
population composition according to micro-level determinants. At one extreme,
differences can be due to pure compositional effects. For instance, lower income for
individuals means more limited possibilities to access housing at a given equal market
price, and obviously a change in per-capita income at the national level implies that
there will be more individuals with limited possibilities to access housing, market pricesDemographic Research – Special Collection 3: Article 2
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being equal. This may partially account for some differences, although the observed
differences between Central/Eastern and Western Europe go in the opposite direction,
as we could expect from this simple reasoning. Another possible source of
compositional effects is education. For instance, individuals wishing to pursue higher
education may be more prone to leave their parental home to move closer to
universities, and the educational composition of a population may explain part of the
differences in age at leaving home. But as we have noticed, at least among Western
European countries, the amount of economic convergence is by far larger than the
amount of convergence in pathways to adulthood.
Micro-macro interactions are more interesting for the purpose of this paper, both
from the theoretical side and for the possibility of explaining national differences. Some
factors at the macro-level are channeling the impact of micro-level characteristics on
the transition to adulthood. In particular, we shall discuss two types of such
interactions: 1) interactions between individual-level factors and the political-economic
context; 2) social interactions that may shape the transition to adulthood, and that imply
persisting national differences even when the underlying factors are no longer active.
These types of interactions can fuel macro-level factors and contribute to perpetuating
differentials, both between and within societies.
Among scholars interested in the impact of welfare regimes during the life course,
there has been a long-lasting interest in comparing the impact of micro-level factors
among different societies. An example of the interaction between individual-level
factors and institutional context can be found for instance in the findings of Aassve et
al. (2002). They argue that income differentials can partially explain the postponement
of leaving home in several European societies, but what is most important is that the
effect of income is different according to the welfare regime. Table 5 shows such
impact. Earning an own income is more important for young adults living in Southern
Europe and in liberal market welfare regimes (i.e. the U.K) than for those living in
continental and social democratic welfare regimes. This implies that 1) individual-level
differences in income are more important in accounting for differences in age at leaving
home in countries where leaving home happens at the latest ages (consistently with
predictions from Mayer, 2001 for example); 2) potential policies targeted at increasing
the income of young adults may anticipate independent living more in countries where
such independent living is postponed; 3) small differences in average income (i.e. per-
capita income in Southern Europe being slightly lower than the one in Northern
Europe) may become amplified by the institutional arrangement, and thus account for
national differences because of this interaction.
Another example of interaction is between individual-level factors and time-
varying policies. Not only can policies affect the transition to adulthood, but socio-
economic or family policies may also affect different social strata in a different way.Demographic Research – Special Collection 3: Article 2
-- Contemporary Research on European Fertility: Perspectives and Developments --
28 http://www.demographic-research.org
Aassve et al. (2003) analyze the impact of the transition from a general to a means-
tested type of family allowance in Hungary during the mid-1990s. The impact of the
policy change has been to broaden the age gap in the transition to motherhood between
high and low social strata (represented by educational levels). As soon as the family
allowance became universal again, the differences returned to the initial level. The
interaction between micro-level and macro-level is also present in the interrelationships
between events in the transition to adulthood: Baizán et al. (2002), for instance, have
shown that out-of-union conceptions lead more often to marriage than to cohabitation in
West Germany, with respect to Sweden. This can be explained by the presence of
differences in both the fiscal treatment and the acceptability of pre-marital births in the
two societies.
Table 5: Effects on the probability of leaving home, of being employed and having
income in the upper quartile (inverse Mill’s ratio). Estimates from the
European Community Household Panel.
Males Females
Denmark 0.311 0.982
France 0.508 0.323
Germany -0.003 0.810
Greece 0.665 0.693
Italy 0.631 0.635
Netherlands 0.074 -0.663
Portugal 1.199 0.965
Spain 1.239 0.926
United Kingdom 0.628 0.568
Source: Aassve et al. (2002).
The lesson we can learn from micro-macro interactions on the determinants of the
transition to adulthood is that there is nothing like the true effect of a variable when
studying the life courses of Europeans. Europe is heterogeneous and ever changing. The
institutional and cultural variables we have discussed in Section 2.1 are always – with
variable extent – channeling the impact of micro-level factors, although one can devise
groups of societies where similar outcomes may be predicted. The combination of
measures of factors at both macro- and micro-level in the explanation of micro-level
transitions to adulthood is certainly a promising avenue that will have to be followed in
the years to come.Demographic Research – Special Collection 3: Article 2
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As far as social interactions are concerned, they have been of primary interest in
the recent demographic literature on fertility decline (i.e. Bongaarts and Watkins, 1996;
Montgomery and Casterline, 1996; Kohler, 2001), and they have also been used as a
possible explanation of lowest-low fertility (Kohler et al., 2002). Social interaction
effects refer mainly to “social influence” and “social learning”. Their peculiarities are
such, as they may entail 1) social multiplier effects (similar to the ones we have noticed
on the interaction between income and institutional setting), with overall behavioral
impact that is larger than what has been initially triggered; 2) multiple equilibria, with
more than one stable regime (i.e. early home-leaving such as in Nordic countries, and
late home-leaving such as in Southern Europe); 3) status-quo enforcement and path
dependence, where the present situations maintain long-term impact. As an example,
the decision to stay in the parental home versus leaving is likely to be affected by social
learning: young adults may use their friends as a point of comparison in their decision
making about leaving home. In this case, a widespread postponement of home-leaving
(i.e. like in Southern Europe) leaves fewer opportunities for social learning, and the
postponement may become even more pronounced. The same impact is plausible for
union formation, and for first births (Kohler et al., 2002). Other factors like social
norms or feedback from the marriage market are included in the impact of social
interaction. Of great importance for our argumentation here are the consequences for
national-level differences in the transition to adulthood. We name two such
consequences. First, the presence of multiple equilibria and path dependence imply a
much stronger stability of long-term differences (i.e. based on long-term family models
or on institutional settings), independently of the convergence in terms of other factors.
Second, social interaction effects typically give rise to transitions that continue
independently of the factors that originated from such transitions. The idea of
postponement transition has been used by Kohler et al. (2002) to describe the
postponement of first births, but it can be translated to other events during early
adulthood, such as leaving home and first union. As we have seen from data on leaving
home in Table 1, however, the postponement of home-leaving is not visible i.e. in
Nordic countries, and this is particularly plausible as the present situation may be a
stable equilibrium. In general, the postponement transition is visible for first births and
marriage, while it is not widespread for first unions in general, and leaving home. We
shall use the idea of multiple equilibria a bit later on to speculate on the presence of two
extreme – and relatively stable – patterns of transition to adulthood in Europe.Demographic Research – Special Collection 3: Article 2
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3. Macro-macro relationships: some interesting cross-country
correlations with age at leaving home (are there two patterns?)
We have referred to the timing and context of leaving the parental home as the event in
the transition to adulthood, where both 1) international differences in Europe are
importantly marked; and 2) there is no clear common trend, and on the contrary, there
seem to be divergent trends with countries at one extreme (“latest-late”) clearly
postponing, and countries at the other extreme (“earliest-early”), stable in their early
transition. We have also argued that a complex web of macro-level explanatory factors
is necessary to get to the extreme case, and we have also argued that the macro-level
factors may interact with micro-level determinants. In the fertility literature, there has
been a recent upsurge of interest in the analysis of cross-sectional correlations as a tool
to gain additional knowledge of the determinants of international differences. In
particular, there is a line in the literature discussing the reasons of the changing cross-
country correlation between female labor force participation and fertility in the last part
of the Twentieth century (see i.e. Ahn and Mira, 2002; Engelhardt and Prskawetz, 2004;
Kögel, 2004). This approach has been generalized, and one can see that several cross-
country relationships between fertility and fertility-related behaviors have changed from
the 1970s to the 1990s (Billari and Kohler, 2004). Here we follow this purely macro
cross-national approach, and perform an exploratory analysis based on cross-country
correlation coefficients to relate the timing of leaving home with a series of socio-
economic indicators on 1) the social and economic condition of youth and 2) the
relationships between generations. Of course, cross-country correlations cannot be
considered an indication of cause-effect relationship. We use them to discuss the
macro-level ideas outlined above, with some provoking speculations, and to discuss the
potential stability of the opposite situations “latest-late” and “earliest-early”.
Table 6 reports the matrix of correlation coefficients between the median ages at
leaving home derived from the FFS (Note 9) and other indicators, stemming mostly
from OECD source. We focus on the first column, where we see the correlation of the
various indicators with the timing of leaving home. As far as intergenerational
relationships are concerned, we see that the median age at leaving home is positively
correlated (0.620) with the share of social expenditure for old-age pensions, and
negatively correlated (-0.714) with the share of older adults living in institutions. This is
in accordance with Reher’s “strong family” hypothesis, and with the idea that these
deeply-rooted differences may have shaped the institutional settings. However, a causal
feedback cannot be ruled out as well. What is important here is that “latest-late”
transitions out of the parental home are more common in countries in which the welfare
is strongly directed towards the elderly, and in which, according to the literature, the
elderly have a stronger say in family ties (see i.e. Glaser and Tomassini, 2000 andDemographic Research – Special Collection 3: Article 2
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Tomassini et al., 2003). The same consistent picture arises when we look at indicators
of the socio-economic status of young adults. The median age at leaving home is
negatively correlated with the relative risk of becoming poor during early adulthood (-
0.522), and with the suicide rate (-0.430): note that the correlation between suicide rates
and poverty is lower in absolute terms being 0.280. There seem to be some advantages
of the “strong family” model with late independence in terms of protection of young
adults from poverty and mental breakdown (Note 10). Of course, we cannot translate
directly these correlations to the individual level: we may, however, speculate that in
countries characterized by the “strong family”, when the family is weak (given the lack
of welfare), poverty and other problems may become much more important (again, this
is the interaction of institutional setting and individual-level features). The strength of
the family goes also against the strength of welfare transfers and of other types of
relationships: the median age at leaving home is negatively correlated with
unemployment benefits (in terms of replacement rate) for singles (-0.387), and with the
participation in associations or other non-profit organizations (-0.562).
Table 6: Cross-country correlation matrix between indicators of home-leaving
timing and other indicators in European FFS countries (end of the
1990s).
LHOME POVER PENSIO INSTIT SUICIDE REPLAC ASSOC
LHOME 1.000
POVER -0.522 1.000
PENSIO 0.620 -0.628 1.000
INSTIT -0.714 0.771 -0.718 1.000
SUICIDE -0.430 0.280 -0.398 0.211 1.000
REPLAC -0.387 0.664 -0.450 0.499 0.157 1.000
ASSOC -0.562 0.667 -0.730 0.854 0.256 0.196 1.000
Note: data refer to 19 countries (with some missing values). Raw data are available from the author upon request.
Definition and sources: LHOME: Billari et al. (2001), UN/ECE FFS Standard Country Tables:
http://www.unece.org/ead/pau/ffs/ffs_standtabframe.htm. Data refer to women of cohorts born around 1960;
POVER: Relative risk of poverty: share of population in age 18-25 in poverty (below 50% of median adjusted disposable income
of the entire population) divided by share of population in age 18-25. Source: Förster (2000); PENSIO: Expenditure in pension
divided by total social expenditure, 1997. Source: OECD (2000); INSTIT: Share of population aged 65 and over in institutions
(mid-1990s). OECD online database; SUICIDE: Suicide rates. OECD (from World Health Organisation, 2001, Mental health
project on suicide prevention named “Live your life”). Data on ages 25-34; REPLAC: Wage replacement rate for unemployed
singles. Source OECD online database, Benefits and Wages, OECD Indicators; ASSOC: Average number of associations and
groups individuals belong to (ages 25-50). OECD (Inglehart et al., 2000), World Values Surveys and European Values Surveys,
1981-1984, 1990-1993, and 1995-1997 [Computer file]. ICPSR version. Ann Arbor, MI: Institute for Social Research [producer],
2000. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2000.Demographic Research – Special Collection 3: Article 2
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All these analyses suffer from the weakness of the technique, but they do not
falsify the idea that transitions to adulthood, and in particular the departure from the
parental home, may be rooted in systems that are consistent and particularly resisting to
changes and common trends. If we look at the motivation behind what youth thinks
about late home-leaving (Table 7), it is precisely in Sweden (with a high state support)
that we see the highest share of “can’t afford to move out” answer, although Spain
shows an equally high level in 2001. Housing problems are named more frequently in
the Netherlands (where the state supports housing to a great extent). “New modern”
strong ties (parents are less strict) are more frequently cited in Greece and Italy, Austria
and Germany, indicating the feeling that co-residence is more often a choice there, with
respect to other countries. We can thus conclude this part by hypothesizing that the two
opposite patterns “latest-late” and “earliest-early” are consistent with the macro-level
situation of the respective societies (familialistic welfare state on the one hand, and
Table 7: Share of young adults (age 15-24) who mention reasons for why youth
are living longer at their parents’ home. European Union (15 states).
Can’t afford to move out Not enough suitable housing Parents are less strict
1997 2001 1997 2001 1997 2001
A u s t r i a 5 8 5 74 52 62 73 5
B e l g i u m 6 1 5 41 99 3 22 4
D e n m a r k 6 4 6 34 45 63 03 1
Finland 79 75 34 44 32 27
F r a n c e 8 6 7 51 92 03 12 6
Germany 62 58 29 17 35 39
Germany (East) 69 64 41 13 33 31
Germany (West) 61 56 31 19 36 42
G r e e c e 6 8 7 2  8  72 63 6
Ireland 71 74 25 40 24 22
I t a l y 7 2 6 01 71 43 43 4
Luxembourg 52 50 22 22 33 19
Netherlands 72 49 37 52 26 31
Portugal 65 52 42 30 26 21
S p a i n 8 0 8 23 23 51 51 8
Sweden 95 81 34 49 14 20
United Kingdom 78 77 39 32 21 17
EU 15 74 67 28 25 28 28
Coefficient of variation
between countries
10.96 11.35 10.69 15.10 6.24 6.99
Source: Eurobarometer (INRA, 2001). The coefficient of variation is computed using the data for Germany only (not distinguishing
East and West Germany).Demographic Research – Special Collection 3: Article 2
-- Contemporary Research on European Fertility: Perspectives and Developments --
http://www.demographic-research.org 33
social-democratic welfare state on the other hand) and are thus fairly stable equilibria.
Maybe the in-between situations (early home-leaving in liberal market countries, and
medium home-leaving in conservative welfare countries) are not as stable as the
extreme case. As intergenerational relationships substantially shape these two extreme
patterns “latest-late” and “earliest-early”, the future aging population, with a quicker
aging in “latest-late” countries (Billari et al., 2000), may be the challenge that will put
the very existence of such patterns in discussion.
4. Discussion
We have illustrated the idea that extreme cases (and their opposites) in demographic
research are important challenges for researchers. We have also noticed that the
heterogeneity of European countries is a blessing for scholars interested in studying the
importance of macro-level conditions in shaping the life courses of youth. The
transition to adulthood in Europe, with the “latest-late” pattern of Southern Europe,
provides an extreme case among industrialized countries. This extreme case can be
compared to its opposite that we dare call the “earliest-early” pattern of transition to
adulthood in Nordic countries. Explaining the emergence and persistence of such
extreme cases implies references to multifaceted approaches. Welfare state and
institutional arrangements, historical and deeply rooted cultural differences, as well as
economic and policy factors, and ideational change, all contribute in creating an
extreme case at the national level. Such factors also contribute in explaining that micro-
level life course determinants play different roles in different European societies. Given
current knowledge, and the ideas that first there may be multiple equilibria in the way
the transition to adulthood is shaped (if there are equilibria at all), and second path
dependence assures that the present and past situation affects the future course, extreme
cases can be quite stable and population aging may become the main homeostatic force
contributing to a convergence of behavior.
Future research on becoming an adult in Europe will gain a great advantage from
the new generation of longitudinal surveys, coupled with contextual-level databases that
is foreseen for instance in the Generations and Gender Programme since its inception
(Hoem et al., 2000). These surveys, with their multidisciplinary orientations, will allow
researchers to assess the relative weight of factors in shaping international differences.
We agree with Lesthaeghe (1998) that demographers should avoid “disciplinary soccer
games” like in the culture vs. economy debate, but we also see the need for assessing
the relative importance of different types of factors. Our provocative ideas on cross-
country correlations between age at home-leaving and other socio-economic indicators,
and on the “two patterns” of transition to adulthood, also call for a greater importanceDemographic Research – Special Collection 3: Article 2
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of the study of implications of demographic events, both at the individual and at the
social level. A greater attention placed on the implications of demographic events will
be of enormous importance to understand the meaning of such events in a
heterogeneous Europe.
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Notes
1.   In the paper we will often make use of research that has been carried on within the
Research Group on the Demography of Early Adulthood at the Max Planck
Institute for Demographic Research in the period 1999-2002.
2.   Of course, societal transformations sharply affecting institutional settings have
taken place in Europe, and not only in Central and Eastern Europe after the fall of
the Iron Curtain. Three countries in Southern Europe (Greece, Spain, and Portugal)
found their way out of dictatorship only in the mid 1970s.
3.   Esping-Andersen (1999, 94) states: “a simple 'three worlds' typology may suffice
for most of the purposes that this book pursues. The final judgment is not yet in,
and we shall in fact see that the distinctiveness of the Southern European countries
does make its mark on issues such as post-industrial employment adaptation. ”
4.   “Familialistic” according to Esping-Andersen (1999).
5.   This four-type categorisation is consistent with Ferrera (1996), Trifiletti (1999) and
Mayer (2001). The typologies outlined have been criticised by feminists for their
lack of genderization, and other groupings of countries have been proposed (see the
review of Neyer, 2003).
6.   See also Monnier and Rychtarikova (1991).
7.   For a critical view on the individualization thesis as applied to the transition to
adulthood see Schizzerotto and Lucchini (2002).
8.   Some scholars put together the four types of explanations we have discussed to
develop clusters of countries. Mellens (1999a; 1999b) develops a clustering of
European countries based on demographic and socio-economic variables. This
clustering is used to define the “diversity” of European countries that lies under
scenarios for population projections (de Beer and van Wissen, 1999). Five clusters
are identified, according to the dominant “culture”: 1) the maternalistic cluster
including the five Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and
Sweden), which as a main characterization has “the relatively high level of female
participation in the labor market, the high level of childcare facilities and the fact
that female values like co-operation are emphasized”, together a “relatively low
level of individualism and conservativism” (Mellens, 1999b, 34); 2) the pragmatic
cluster includes Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg,
Netherlands, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom, with high emphasis on
economic performance and “not extreme” scores on the equality of gender roles
and conservativism; 3) the paternalistic cluster including Southern EuropeanDemographic Research – Special Collection 3: Article 2
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countries (Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain), with “the prevalence of traditional
family values, the lack of female emancipation and the low level of childcare
facilities” (Mellens, 1999b, 36), with high scores on conservativism and low on
gender equality; 4) the intermediate culture, in Central Europe (Croatia, Czech
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovak Republic, and
Slovenia), which characterizes the more westernized of the former communist
countries; 5) the post-totalitarian cluster (Belarus, Bulgaria, Moldova, Romania,
Russia, and Ukraine), with an “incomplete transition to a capitalist structure”
(Mellens, 1999b, 37). In building population scenarios, it is assumed that the
differences among clusters persist, although convergence within clusters will be
observed. A similar approach is adopted by Pinnelli et al. (2001).
9.   The median age is refereed to women of cohorts born around 1960. As cross-
national differences are rather persistent (Corijn and Klijzing, 2001; Billari and
Wilson, 2001), this figure can be considered as representative of the home-leaving
pattern at the national level.
10.  Research on home-leaving in the United Kingdom has traditionally been concerned
with the poverty risks of youth leaving home at early ages (Jones, 1995).Demographic Research – Special Collection 3: Article 2
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